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Introduction
In February 2012 the CBS-affiliated channel KMOV, based in St. Louis, Missouri, broadcast a short news feature entitled 'Life Down Under: Survival Condos Promise to Protect Against a Nuclear Attack' (KMOV 2012) as part of its 'News 4 St. Louis'. The feature detailed a visit to a former US Air Force Atlas F missile silo 'somewhere in Kansas' (the exact location kept secret) to report on the development of a 'Luxury Survival Condo' complex under the supervision of the project developer, Larry Hall. In response to questions from a seemingly incredulous reporter, Hall confirmed that residents of St. Louis were among those that had expressed an interest in the underground complex (one of a projected three in development),
where condos retail at a reported $1.5m for a half floor, $3m for a full floor (Dowling 2014;  see also Luxury Survival Condo, 2016) . Built in 1960, the silo was 'hardened' to protect the nuclear-armed missile it housed. No longer in use for its original purpose, Hall's project has worked to build a technological support system for comfort living into the 175ft deep reinforced concrete structure, designed to allow residents to survive with a in-built supply of food, water, clean air and electricity to last up to five years in the event of a nuclear attack (or, indeed, according to Hall, in the event of any other kind of global catastrophe). As well as residences the condo would host a grocery store, medical, rooms, dental office, shooting range, indoor dog park, movie theatre and indoor pool and water slide amongst its other facilities (see Logic Integration 2013).
The 'functionality' of the complex as a whole would be based around integrated computer systems that as well as monitoring and sustaining physical living conditions such as air filtration and water sensors, would also ensure the provision of state of the art audio visual facilities, lighting control and entertainment systems for residents. The intention, according to system designer Bill Craig, is that in the event of catastrophe residents could 'live here and enjoy the facility, not just survive ' (in Logic Integration 2013: 1:38) . Ultimately the challenge and the reward of the project from a design perspective was that it '…took a facility intended to destroy and turned it into a facility intended to preserve ' (in Logic Integration 2013: 3:45, emphasis added).
Marketing the dream of luxury survival living to the 1% of Americans that would be able to afford it (Foster 2016: 295) , the Luxury Survival Condos might be regarded as simply the latest manifestation of what Joseph Masco (2009) has termed the 'bunker society'. During the Cold War, as Masco forensically details and illustrates, the construction of purpose-built underground nuclear shelters constituted a key element of federal civil defense efforts from the mid-1950s onwards. As an attempted means of state management of collective nuclear fear, Masco argues, during the Cold War these '…built spaces stocked with state-of-the-art technologies and commodities presented a utopian vision of an invulnerable America closed off from the outside world but still functioning perfectly ' (2009, 13 ).
Yet while clearly continuous with that lineage the Luxury Survival Condos are distinctive in that as opposed to being purpose-built, they are instead re-purposed: the disused nuclear missile silo has been transformed into a living space. In the design and marketing of the condos the survivability of the structure and its status as a former nuclear weapon facility as selling points are blended together with the everyday comforts provided by its hotel-like furnishings and features. The condos are also precisely for that reason an interesting kind of 'nuclear thing', to use the terminology employed by Gabrielle Hecht (2012) , where Hecht argues that we can identify different manifestations of 'nuclearity' as 'a technopolitical phenomenon that emerges from political and cultural configurations of technical and scientific things, from the social relations where knowledge is produced ' (2012: 15, emphasis in original). Hecht's understanding of nuclearity points to an approach that seeks to analyse not just how 'nuclear things' are distinguished as being uniquely different from 'non-nuclear things', but also how nuclear things are distinguished from -and related to -each other in contextually specific ways (see also the editors' Introduction and Sonja D. Schmid's contribution to this special issue). The Luxury Survival Condos serve as an exemplar in this respect, taking as they do an artefact of the nuclear age once used to house nuclear weapons but now marketed in large part on the assumed virtues of the facility for sustaining human lives in the event of a nuclear catastrophe.
This theme of configurations of life-destroying and life-sustaining nuclear things as a technopolitical phenomenon is pursued in more detail in this paper, and is explored in relation to the points of overlap and distinction between classical realist and critical theoretic reflections on the 'nuclear condition' in respect of this theme. Classical realist thought provides a diagnosis of the nuclear weapons condition that, at times, seems to call into question the very possibility of politics in the nuclear age. Critical theoretic reflections suggest a more expansive understanding of the nuclear condition and its underpinning combinations of dystopian fears of nuclear destruction and utopian visions of nuclearpowered futures. Elements of each, the paper suggests, can be brought together to inform an immanent critique of the nuclear condition as not just a prevailing situation of global vulnerability and human endangerment, but also as a situation conditional upon a series of assumed distinctions about the nature and applications of nuclear technologies. In particular the paper argues that while classical realists such as Hans J. Morgenthau and John H. Herz focused extensively on the condition of 'Death in the Nuclear Age', the work of critical theorists such as Herbert Marcuse points to a wider concern with the ways in which the prospect of nuclear death exists alongside and is often bound up with claims to the lifesustaining properties and applications of 'the atom'. The latter orients us towards understanding the contemporary nuclear condition as being predicated upon a more complex political and cultural configuration of nuclear things. By way of illustration, the paper details how the post-war 'Atoms for Peace' initiative in particular exemplified a vision of nuclear power that split the 'peaceful atom' from the 'military atom' in a manner that still remains at the core of efforts to regulate the contemporary nuclear condition at an international level. To evaluate the continuing significance of such understandings the paper then turns to a discussion of the International Atomic Energy Agency's campaign to demonstrate 'How the Atom Benefits Life'.
Classical realism and the nuclear weapons condition
My own view is that the development of these weapons can make, if wisely handled, the problem of preventing war, not more hopeless, but more hopeful, than it would otherwise have been, and that this is so not merely because it intensifies the urgency of our hopes, but because it provides new and healthy avenues of approach. In developing these avenues the fact that there is so far-reaching a technical inseparability of the constructive uses of atomic energy from the destructive ones -a fact that at first sight might appear to render the problem only more difficult -this fact is precisely the central vital element that can make effective action possible. If we are clear on this, we shall have some guide for the future (Oppenheimer 1955 (Oppenheimer [1946 .
Coming in the aftermath of the use of nuclear weapons in the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, J. Robert Oppenheimer's reflections on atomic energy indicated a hope not only that the manifest destructiveness of nuclear weapons would lead the world towards avoidance of their use, but also that the 'technical inseparability of the constructive uses of atomic energy from the destructive' provided a residual but crucial prospect for international cooperation on the uses of nuclear power. By contrast to 'Oppenheimer's hope' (Peoples 2016: 229) , the writings of Hans J. Morgenthau and John H. Herz in the late 1950s and early 1960s suggested a profound shift to a new existential global condition with the advent of the 'nuclear age' and a much more pessimistic outlook. Indeed their work during that period -written in the wake of the development of thermonuclear weapons and the corresponding increase in the destructive potential of nuclear weapons -is marked by an overriding focus on and concern with the global existential threat created by the 'nuclear revolution' as a key facet of their wider considerations of post-war political modernity (see Craig 2003; van Munster and Sylvest 2014; ). Morgenthau's (1961) reflections in 'Death in the Nuclear Age' stand out as the most prominent variation on this theme, declaring that it was the very 'possibility of nuclear death' had become the defining feature of the nuclear condition:
The significance of the possibility of nuclear death is that it radically affects the meaning of death, of immortality, of life itself. It affects that meaning by destroying most of it. Nuclear destruction is mass destruction, both of persons and of things. It signifies the simultaneous destruction of tens of millions of people, of whole families, generations, and societies, of all the things that they have inherited and created. For Morgenthau, it was not simply that the advent of a particular type of technology marked the distinction between the nuclear and pre-nuclear age. The constant and realisable possibility of nuclear death constituted a 'qualitative transformation of the meaning of our existence' (Morgenthau 1961: 4) , but one which policy makers had generally failed to recognise. In terms that arguably parallel his critique of the 'rationalistic' approach of 'scientific man' (Morgenthau 1946; see Russell 1991: 119) , Morgenthau would later go on to lament the fact that 'while our conditions of life have drastically changed under the impact of the nuclear age, we still live in our thoughts and act through our institutions in an age that has passed ' (1964: 23) , and the fact that at a political level the recognition was lacking developments in the destructive capacity of nuclear armaments had 'radically altered the relations that have existed since the beginning of history between the ends of foreign policy and violence as a means to these ends ' (1962: 11 states in the international system interacted with one another. There he characterised the 'nuclear situation' as the …unprecedented condition that has befallen mankind. And the first thing to realize is that the situation confronts for the first time the whole human race as one group, negatively, it is true, for it is the menace rather than the promise, the destructive rather than the constructive and creative potentiality of atomic energy that concerns the group as such by placing its very continuance in doubt (1962 [1959] : 304).
In the wake of the H-bomb's exponential increase in destructive capacity as well as the quantitative increase in the number of nuclear weapons and innovations in their means of delivery, contra Oppenheimer's 'hope' Herz made explicit the view that appeals to the 'constructive' applications of atomic energy were a distraction from, or at the very least secondary to, its destructive potentiality. Instead of an expectation that international cooperation could be anchored in the collaborative development of nuclear power for energy production, he argued that the destructive potential of nuclear weapons reinvigorated the idea of world government. Indeed it necessitated its development precisely because 'the chief external function of the modern state […] seems to have vanished ' (1962 [1959] creates what a German author has referred to as "the interdependence of doom"' (Herz 1962 (Herz [1959 : 303-304). The only true hope for human survival in the nuclear age, Herz contended, was that out of the fear of global nuclear annihilation '[A]n attitude of "universalist concern"' may yet 'save us' (Herz 1962 (Herz [1959 : 302).
Critical theory: Aporetic immanent critique of nuclear modernity
In short, Morgenthau and Herz identified the nuclear condition as a nuclear weapons could be employed to manage the nuclear condition being the ultimate such fallacy. Herz identified the technological dimensions of the 'change which the advent of the "atomic" or "nuclear age" has wrought' as:
…the accumulated and accumulating impact of a process which can be termed truly revolutionary: the process of scientific invention and technological discovery which not only has "perfected" the fission and fusion weapons themselves, but in its wake so far has brought jet aircraft with intercontinental range and super-sonic speed, missiles with nuclear warheads, and the prospect of nuclear-powered planes and submarines with unlimited range, and rockets with equally unlimited range and with guidance to specific targets anywhere in the world (Herz 1962 (Herz [1959 note '…there is undoubtedly some thematic overlap and some common preoccupations' (Scheuerman 2009: 573) . Allowing for such common preoccupations, a crucial distinction is that whereas Morgenthau and Herz follow a direction of travel that takes them from a concern with the nuclear weapons condition to more a more expansive critique of technology, the critical thinking of the Frankfurt School might be said to take a similar route in the opposite direction: nuclear technologies are regarded as the apotheosis of the modern technological condition, an outgrowth of processes of rationalisation and instrumentalisation that precede (see for example Marcuse (1941) ) the advent of the nuclear age.
In part this is evident from how and where nuclear technologies feature in the work of thinkers associated with the Frankfurt School, where they often serve as illustrative examples of the wider tendencies of 'industrial society'. Thus, for example, does Theodor Adorno's oft-cited proclamation that 'there is no universal history leading from savagery to humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb' (Adorno 1972: 343) Marcuse discusses nuclear technologies is notable precisely for the way he treats the subject.
The introduction to the first edition of One-Dimensional Man opens with the passage:
Does not the threat of an atomic catastrophe which could wipe out the human race also serve to protect the very forces which perpetuate this danger? The efforts to prevent such a catastrophe overshadow the search for its potential causes in contemporary industrial society […] We submit to the peaceful production of the means of destruction, to the perfection of waste, to being educated for a defense which deforms the defenders and that which they defend (Marcuse 1964: xli) .
In this sense Marcuse uses the spectre of 'atomic catastrophe' to exemplify the 'onedimensional' nature of industrial society, with nuclear technologies cited as emblematic of a 'vast, repressive technological civilization that was bringing every aspect of humanity under its control' (Winner 1986: 66 in pleasing surroundings; Civil Defense Headquarters display a "deluxe fallout-shelter" with wall-to-wall carpeting ("soft"), lounge chairs, television , and Scrabble, "designed as a combination family room during peacetime (sic!) and family fallout shelter should war break out" (Marcuse 1964 : 248, emphasis added). As Seyla Benhabib (1986: 149) argues, though, with the transition to 'the critique of instrumental reason', influenced by Max Weber's account of rationalization and disenchantment and exemplified in different ways in Adorno and Horkheimer's (1972 immanent critique that remains is 'aporetic' in nature. Although a concern with identifying emancipatory potentialities persisted to some degree, that concern became largely secondary to (and arguably at times is even precluded by) the identification of persistent and apparently insoluble contradictions within modern societies. Adorno's (1972) theorisation of 'negative dialectics' constitutes perhaps the ultimate form of aporetic immanent critique, insofar as it '…denies that there is an immanent logic to the actual that is emancipatory' (Benhabib, 1986: 173) . In short, 'Adorno rejects the logic of immanence, while preserving immanent critique' (Benhabib, 1986 : 173, emphasis in original).
For some, most prominently for Jürgen Habermas, the latter move effectively
constituted, if not an abandonment of immanent critique, then a blind alley, necessitating a revitalisation of normative critique on different terms (see Vaki 2005). But it is in this sense
of an aporetic mode of immanent critique that we can understand Adorno's identification of the 'reconciling side of the irreconcilable' and Marcuse's diagnosis of submission to 'the peaceful production of the means of destruction'. Marcuse's own sense of incredulity at the 'willful play with fantastic possibilities ' (1964: 247) in itself constituted a refusal to accept the association of nuclear catastrophe with such imagery of scientific endeavour and human achievement. For both the nuclear age is replete with instances of such contradictions that fail to reduce to a straightforward resolution, but are instead perpetuated by a seemingly productive tensions and sustained by utopian visions of how nuclear technologies might be incorporated into and reconciled with industrial civilization. Their reflections on the advent of the nuclear age are aporetic in the sense that they are pervaded by a sense of perplexity at reconciling of life-destroying and life-sustaining tendencies. Here it is precisely the 'promise'
of nuclear technologies to sustain and preserve life rather than their potential to destroy it comes to play an important part. The 'willful play with fantastic possibilities', Marcuse suggests, soften and offset awareness of the capacity for global annihilation in the nuclear age. As the proceeding sections seek to illustrate, such a mode of analysis constitutes a particularly powerful way of understanding efforts to reconcile the ostensibly divergent applications of nuclear technologies.
Atoms for peace
While the classical realist diagnosis of the nuclear condition as articulated by Morgenthau and Herz arguably assumes nuclear weapons to be the defining technology of the modern era, efforts to differentiate and distinguish between nuclear things have been a persistent and continuing feature of the nuclear age right from its 'beginning'. The idea that 'the close technical parallelism and interrelation of the peaceful and the military applications of atomic energy ceases to be a difficulty, and becomes a help' (Oppenheimer 1955 (Oppenheimer [1946 Sceptics, of course, doubt whether such initiatives were ever truly intended to curtail the development of and eliminate possession of nuclear weapons, and suggest that they were instead intended to obscure their continued development and possession. Thus for example, Even if the subsequent implementation of the proposal fell short of a rapid, US-led global transformation of that destructive capacity into 'universal, efficient and economic usage' it nonetheless set in policy a progressive vision of nuclear power. Most importantly, and institutionalised in 1957 with the formation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Atoms for Peace proposal established a continuum of 'destructive' and 'constructive' applications of nuclear power, with efforts to constrain the former seen to be innately related to efforts to enable the latter. Thus Eisenhower proposed that the role of an international atomic energy agency should not only be to uphold a 'system of world-wide inspection and control' as regards military applications and to impound and store fissionable material, but should also be put to work to '…devise methods whereby this fissionable material would be allocated to serve the peaceful pursuits of mankind. Experts will be mobilized to apply atomic energy to the needs of agriculture, medicine and other peaceful activities. A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical energy in the powerstarved areas of the world' (Eisenhower 1953: np) .
Atoms for Peace thus established and institutionalised a particular kind of chain of association between different kinds of nuclear things, envisaging a specific international technopolitical configuration: 'Atoms for peace remade US foreign and nuclear policy in the years to follow, [and] would reshape the political and technological map through the export of knowledge, fissionable material and equipment' (Drogan 2016: 974) . The application of atomic energy to agriculture, as advocated in Eisenhower's speech, came to be a key part of wider efforts to 'modernise' agricultural production in developing countries in 1960s (see viewers with the fabled genie as a vehicle for understanding atomic power: dangerous upon its initial release, but then tricked and contained again in the lamp, and eventually pressed into the service of the fisherman who pulled it out of the sea (Disney 1957: 0mins-7:41) .
At the heart of such characterisations '…was the bipolarity of weapons versus peaceful uses, the atomic genie who could be either menace or servant' (Weart 1988: 88; 2012: 170) . In this configuration, applications of nuclear technologies in war, health, agriculture and energy were treated as distinct but crucially interrelated at one and the same time. Even the US development of the hydrogen bomb could not, it seemed, entirely displace the nutopian promise of the use of nuclear energy for the unlimited production of electricity Plowshare' foresaw and planned for the widespread 'geographical engineering of continental river systems, dams, quarries, vast road cuts, and "nuclear blasted" instant harbors' (Kirsch 2005: 3) . In perhaps the most obvious attempt to re-purpose nuclear weapons to 'constructive' ends within the wider context of Atoms for Peace (see Kaufman 2012: 2-3),
Plowshare 'involved turning the planet into an imaginative space for nuclear engineering, as
proponents sought a project big enough to sell to the mass public as well as to industry and government the idea of converting the bomb from weapon of mass destruction to engineering tool' (Masco 2016: 58) .
How the atom benefits life
Of course in the contemporary era 'It is impossible to discuss "nuclear modernity" without also recording social challenges to such a vision' (Irwin 2000: 84) , and the early nutopianism 'death in the nuclear age' in its activities to constrain nuclear proliferation and to promote the safety if nuclear facilities, the agency simultaneously continues to promote and exemplify the contributions of the 'peaceful atom' to human life and health.
With regards to the latter it can of course reasonably be pointed out that radiation is part of human life. 'Living things have evolved in an environment which has significant levels of ionising radiation', the World Nuclear Association points out; 'Furthermore, many of us owe our lives and health to such radiation produced artificially. Medical and dental Xrays discern hidden problems, and some people are treated with radiation to cure disease. We all benefit from a multitude of products and services made possible by careful use of such radiation' (World Nuclear Association, 2012: np Hamblin's argument suggests that such an evaluation is deeply politicised, part of an ingrained IAEA 'outlook' wherein 'the future is nuclear, and we should set aside our objections ' (2012: 292) .
Conclusion
Reflecting on Disney's Our Friend the Atom and its allegory of the destructive genie freed and then tamed, the physicist and historian Spencer R. Weart argued the film's central motif to be representative of a 'history of images' in which hopes and fears about the potential of nuclear power is all too commonly rendered and imagined via 'archaic themes ' and 'primal associations' (1988: 73; 298 ). Weart's work is regularly perforated by his 'wish' that '…we could have a moratorium on the archaic images that incite such emotions' (Weart 1988: 430-431; 2012: 304) 4 and his sense that even otherwise coolheaded nuclear physicists too often indulged in the temptation to characterise nuclear power in either utopian or apocalyptic terms when they came to propose arrangements to control and manage the spread of nuclear technologies in the post-war decades. Instead of 'grand schemes' to govern the international nuclear order, Weart suggests that 'solutions' to the problem of nuclear energy should be '…more complex and modest ' (1988: 429; cf. Weart 2012: 301) and that these kinds of bipolar characterisations of the 'bad atom' and the 'good atom' were and are thus particularly
unhelpful.
Yet Weart's wide-ranging catalogue of the 'imagery' of the nuclear age perhaps in the process underestimates the significant and continuing role of a particular kind of nuclear narrative that maintains and institutionalises distinctions between 'good' and 'bad' atom in ways and in configurations that are often complex. The Atoms for Peace initiative and the How the Atom Benefits Life campaign can be considered as historical counterparts and comparisons in this respect. While both share the lasting diptych of 'atoms for peace' and 'atoms for war', the How the Atom Benefits Life campaign is separated out from discussion of the IAEA's activities in relation to nuclear weapons, and while the campaign references the potential for provision of electricity from nuclear energy it is grounded in case studies of contributions of radiation and nuclear techniques and technologies to everyday life rather than the grand claims of the Eisenhower era.
The cases discussed here thus suggest subtle variations in the technopolitical phenomenon of nuclearity as manifested in efforts to govern the international nuclear order over time. Uniting both, though, is an association of destructive and productive application of nuclear science technologies that -as Sonja Schmid puts it elsewhere in this special issue -'…rests on nearly incompatible interpretations of nuclear materiality'. In the promotion of Atoms for Peace, this association was made explicit from the outset -Eisenhower spoke of the 'awful arithmetic ' (1953: np) that had been and could be further caused by the use of nuclear weapons in war, but sought to offset that against the scale of the benefits that could accrue from peaceful applications of nuclear power. With the How the Atoms Benefits Life campaign, the association is institutionalised within the IAEA itself rather than internal to the campaign given that the IAEA is concerned with all things nuclear -weapons, energy and wider applications.
Rather than separating out, then, discussions of 'death' and 'life' in the nuclear age, an approach based on immanent critique as outlined here might instead look to analyse how the two are associated and related to one another within proposals to manage and regulate the nuclear condition (cf Schmid in this issue). That approach is intimated in classical realist scholarship, is made more explicit in critical theoretic reflections, and can be extended into a concern with identifying different manifestations of nuclearity. Such a form of immanent critique may ultimately be aporetic -that is it may do more do highlight the ways in which proposals to manage and regulate the nuclear condition emphasise the 'reconciling side of the irreconcilable' (Adorno 1972: 343) rather than performing the feat of resolving the tensions between 'atoms for peace' and 'atoms for war'. But in the process we might at least come to a better understanding of the antinomies and technopolitics of the nuclear condition, and of life in the nuclear age.
Notes
and Fukushima -but also the sublime beauty of the atomic world, and how x-rays and MRI scans have improved human lives. The nuclear age has been a nightmare, but dreamlike too' (BBC 2015: np) .
